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Criminalizing Endangerment: A Response to
Marcelo Ferrante's Comment
R. A. Duff
I am very grateful to Marcelo Ferrante for his careful commentary
on my article-but I am also unpersuaded by his criticisms.'
I. ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS
Ferrante finds two general theses in my article; he agrees with
one, but rejects the other.2 He agrees with what he calls "the thesis
of attitudes as wrongrnakers"-that the kind of wrong an action
instantiates can depend on the attitude it expresses. Unfortunately,
that is not a thesis that I want to assert, at least as he understands it
and as far as the criminal law is concerned. He rejects what he calls
"the perfect correspondence thesis"--that actions which are intended
to harm or to endanger others always express an attitude of hostility,
whereas actions not guided by such an intention do not express
anything other or worse than indifference. However, I do not want to
assert that thesis either, at least in the way that he understands it;
indeed, I agree that it is false.
We can often separate an action from the attitude that it expresses,
when we describe the action in a relatively austere way that does not
incorporate its deeper motives, and describe the attitude in a relatively
rich way that reaches beyond the actions that it directly motivates.
Even if we describe an action not simply in terms of its effects upon
the world, but in terms of the immediate intention with which it was
done, our description often (perhaps always) leaves open the question
of what deeper motives or attitudes inform it. We know that D killed
V, intending to do so: but that does not yet tell us whether D's action
was motivated by, for instance, her hatred of V; or by her desire to
achieve an end to which Vs death was simply a means-a means that
D perhaps regretted "having to" use; or by her loving concern to spare
V the further suffering that his terminal illness would cause him. So
too, if we know only that D acted in a way that he knew would harm
V's property, but without any intention to harm it, we do not yet know
whether he was glad that this side-effect would ensue (because he
hated V and would be glad to see her suffer); or really did not care
one way or the other, and would have been neither pleased nor
saddened if he had achieved his aim without damaging V's property;
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or regretted "having to" cause such harm in order to achieve his aim,
and would have been pleased had he (against expectations) achieved
his aim without doing so.
Ferrante relies on this kind of separation between action and
attitude in § 3 of his article: it is illustrated by his discussion of A,
who intends to bum down her neighbor's tree (because it blocks her
view), and B, who intends to bum down his own tree but realizes that
the fire will spread and burn down his neighbor's tree too. He is right
in most of what he says about such examples, in particular in his
claims that an attitude of hostility is not "invariably correlated" with
an intention to harm,3 and that A and B might have "equivalent
dispositions concerning their respective neighbors,"4 in that each
might be willing to damage the neighbor's property in pursuit of the
end of clearing the view, without wishing such damage for its own
sake. That is why I say, of two comparable agents, that "[e]ach, we
might think, displays the same vice or defect of character-a
willingness to damage others' property in pursuit of his own ends, a
serious indifference to others' rights and interests."5
However, the attitudes with which I am concerned are not thus
separable from the actions that manifest them; we therefore cannot
even ask whether they are "invariably correlated" with those actions.
My concern is with the practical attitudes of indifference or of
hostility, that are partly constitutedby the actions that manifest them.6
Thus the hostility that, on my account, an attack involves is not an
attitude separate from and motivating the attack, any more than the
indifference that endangerment can involve is an attitude separate
from the action of knowing endangerment. In both cases, my concern
is with what is "intrinsic" to the action:7 to say that an action
constitutes an attack, i.e. that it is aimed against a victim and is
intended to harm, is to say that it manifests "practical hostility"
toward that victim; and the kind of "indifference" that properly
concerns the criminal law is a matter not of the agent's feelings, but
of the extent to which her actions show her to be ready to modify her
conduct in order to avoid harming others.
3. Id. at 971-76. See text following note 15, for the language of "invariably
correlated."
4. Id. at 975. However, to claim that each has a "positive attitude" to the
destruction of the neighbor's tree, because A intends it, while for B it is evidence
that his action has been successful, ignores what is surely an important difference
between facts that constitute the success of my action and facts that are at most
evidence of its success.
5. R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, 65 La. L. Rev. 941, 947-48
(2005).
6. Id. See also R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability 157-79
(1990); R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts 363-74 (1996).
7. Duff, supra note 5 at 943.
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Someone might now object that if "hostility" and "indifference"
are not, as I use the terms, attitudes that lie behind and motivate our
actions, then talking in these terms adds nothing to my initial
distinction between attacks and endangerments in terms of the agent's
intentions-nothing except possible confusion, since readers might
think that I am talking of attitudes that are separable from the actions
that manifest them. I still think it is useful to use these terms,
however: they help to characterize the kind of wrong that each type
of action constitutes-the kind of wrong that is intrinsic to each type
of action. To talk in these terms can also, I think, help us to articulate
a conception of action that is rich enough to make it plausible to say
that what we are criminally liable for are our actions, since it is those
that constitute the relevant kinds of criminal wrong. If we, instead,
see all attitudes as separable from and lying behind actions, we will
be more tempted to try to ground criminal liability in what thus lies
behind action-a temptation that we should resist.'
My claim that attacks and endangerments are differentt kinds of
wrong because they manifest different attitudes is therefore not the
thesis that Ferrante describes as "the thesis of attitudes as
wrongmakers," since that thesis concerns, whereas my claim does not
concern, attitudes that are separate from the actions that display them.
Nor, accordingly, is my claim undermined by what I agree to be the
falsity of what he calls "the perfect correspondence thesis." Attitudes
that are separable from the actions in which they are displayed are
not, I agree, perfectly correlated with those actions: my concern,
however, is with attitudes that are intrinsic to, because constituted by,
the actions that manifest them. Such attitudes cannot be separated
from those actions-which is to say that no question about the
correlation between them can arise.
II. AIMING AT EVIL
My concern is therefore not with attitudes that lie behind actions,
but with the structures of the actions themselves, and with what I
claim to be the significant moral difference between attacks, which
are structured by the intention to harm, and endangerments, which are
not thus structured. Ferrante also objects to this claim, however, in
§ 4 of his article.
He first draws a distinction, which I admittedly do not draw,
between intending evil and "tracking" evil: between an agent who
(merely) intends to do what is evil or wrong, and one who intends to
8. See also R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an
Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 147 (2002); R.A. Duff, Action,
the ActRequirement and CriminalLiability, in Agency and Action 69 (John Hyman
& Helen Steward eds., 2004).
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do what is evil or wrong because of that in virtue of which it is evil
or wrong; between one who deliberately bums down her neighbor's
tree, despite the fact that this will harm her neighbor, and one who
bums the tree down because this will harm her neighbor. I do not
deny that some such distinction is worth drawing, and morally
significant-although a careful account will be needed of just what
counts as pursuing what is wrong or evil "qua" wrong or evil, as
Ferrante puts it.9 As he notes, however, drawing this distinction does
not by itself undermine my claim that there is also a significant moral
difference between intending to do harm and foreseeing harm as a
side-effect; but that is the claim on which the distinction between
attacks and endangerment depends. What does appear to threaten that
claim is his argument that there are cases in which the agent foresees
harm or evil as a side-effect, i.e. does not intend it, but in which his
action nonetheless "tracks" the evil in that he acts as he does in part
because of the evil that it will do. This possibility is exemplified by
the pilot who foresees civilian casualties as a side-effect of bombing
a military target, and persists with the bombing raid only because
those civilians belong to an ethnic group whose members he thinks
deserve to die. Ferrante argues that such cases show that tracking evil
is quite separate from intending evil (one can intend evil without
tracking it, and track evil without intending it). If "aiming at evil qua
evil" is the ideal type of wrongful action, he then argues, we therefore
cannot say that acting with the intention of doing evil is always
worse-i.e., closer to that (anti-)ideal-than acting with the
knowledge that I will cause evil as a side-effect, since in the latter
case I may be tracking evil while in the former case I might not be.
Had I argued that intending evil is always morally worse, always
more wrongful, than acting in the knowledge that evil will ensue as
a side-effect because it is closer to the (anti-) ideal of wrongfulness,
the kind of case that Ferrante describes might indeed be problematic
for me: but that is not my argument. I argue that the two types of
action-attacks and endangerments-are morally different, but that
is not the same as arguing that they are differently located on a single
scale of moral wrongfulness: "different" does not entail "better" or
"worse," and part of my argument is indeed that we should take
seriously the idea that there are different structures of criminal
wrongfulness. Ferrante's example of the bomber therefore does not
threaten any claim that I make about the difference between attacks
and endangerments.
It is nonetheless an interesting example, which reminds us that
human practical reasoning is far more complicated than the simple
distinction between intention and foresight allows. It could of course
9. Ferrante, supra note 1 at 978.
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be true that the bomber intends both to destroy the military target and
to kill the civilians (seizing the chance to do both through the same
action). It could also be true, however, as Ferrante suggests, that the
civilians' deaths form no part of his intention: which is to say that he
need not think he would have any less reason to drop his bombs if no
civilians were there, or that he would have any reason to drop his
bombs if the civilians were there but the factory was not (for he could
think that it was not his business to act as their executioner). His case
is then morally different both from that of a pilot who drops his
bombs with great sadness at the civilian deaths he knows this will
cause, whoever the civilians are; and from that of a pilot who does
not care about the civilian deaths, whoever the civilians are: his
action is motivated in part by a discriminating racism that those other
pilots do not display. It does not follow either that his action is worse
than, for instance, that of a pilot who does not care about civilian
deaths at all, or that he is shown to be a worse person than such a
pilot: again, "different" does not entail "better" or "worse." Nor, more
to the present point, does it follow that the criminal law should mark
this difference between types of wrongdoing or of moral defect in its
offense definitions. In arguing that the criminal law should
distinguish attacks from endangerments, in virtue of the distinct
structures of moral wrongfulness that the two kinds of action display,
I was not arguing that this is the only distinction that is morally
important, or that it can capture all the relevant differences that moral
discourse should capture: I was arguing only that this distinction,
which is indeed a limited one just because it does not look behind the
actions to the deeper attitudes or motives that inform them, is one that
the criminal law should draw.
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